30 Nov 2022

SPECIAL ISSUE PREVENTIVE RESTRUCTURING 7. The PRD 2019 in Denmark: There is a First for Everything

On 9 June 2022, the Danish Parliament adopted amendments to the Danish Bankruptcy Law in an effort to implement the PRD 2019. While the Directive provided the legislator with a possibility to amend the existing restructuring procedure completely, the Danish legislator refrained from doing so. In general, the legislator implemented only what it had to implement. The reform, however, does introduce some novelties into Danish insolvency law, including a new preventive restructuring procedure.

1. Introduction[1]

On 9 June 2022, the Danish Parliament adopted amendments to the Danish Bankruptcy Law[2] to implement the Preventive Restructuring Directive (PRD) 2019.[3] This new law entered into force on 17 July 2022, just in time for the implementation deadline of the PRD 2019. Denmark has opted out of the EU regulation concerning Justice and Home Affairs, which is why Denmark is among other things not bound by the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) 2015.[4] The legal basis of the PRD 2019 is, however, Article 53 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), dealing with the right to establishment. Therefore, for the first time in the history of Danish insolvency law, Denmark was obliged to implement EU legislation in the area of insolvency law.


2. Overview of domestic pre-reform insolvency law regime

Pre 2022 there were only two collective insolvency procedures available for a distressed business in Denmark. Both were (and are) governed by the Danish Bankruptcy Act (DBA), which originally dates back to 1977.[5] First, an insolvent debtor can enter into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is a liquidation procedure in which the debtor’s assets are liquidated and the proceeds are distributed among the creditors based on the pari passu principle.[6] The overarching purpose of bankruptcy is to maximise the recovery rate for the creditors.


Second, an insolvent debtor can enter into restructuring. This procedure was introduced in 2011 and has been amended in 2021 and 2022. The purpose was to provide a court-regulated procedure for an insolvent debtor, making it possible to rescue an otherwise viable business through a restructuring plan.[7] Officially, the amendments in 2021 were triggered by the expected financial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Danish businesses. However, the changes had already been recommended in 2015 by the Danish Bankruptcy Council (Konkursrådet), an advisory board for the government. They aimed to increase the efficiency of the Danish restructuring regime but were never put forward.[8] The 2021 amendments introduced a separate ‘fast-track restructuring procedure’, under which the debtor was allowed to transfer his business without the need to hold formal meetings in court. In fact, the transfer was possible through an informal voting system based on deemed approval. Moreover, the former mandatory requirement of a court-appointed accountant was also abandoned to, principally, reduce costs.


Prior to the 2021 amendments, approximately 97% of all formal insolvency procedures that were commenced in Denmark were bankruptcy procedures.[9] Stakeholders, including insolvency advisors and creditor organisations, had continuously questioned the efficiency of the restructuring procedure, highlighting that it is rigid, costly and inefficient compared to that of the bankruptcy procedure.[10] Based on this critique, it was the intention of the adopted amendments in 2021 that the restructuring procedure would become more flexible, cheaper and, therefore, more useful for insolvent (yet viable) debtors to overcome their financial difficulties.[11]


3. Implementing the PRD 2019 in Denmark

The implementation of the PRD 2019 brought significant changes in the existing regulation and introduced a completely new procedure. As mentioned above, implementing EU law in Danish insolvency law was a novelty. Moreover, the possibility of opening a procedure prior to the debtor’s insolvency, along with a class voting system, was unfamiliar to Danish law. It was, in fact, instantly met with some scepticism from various stakeholders. The governmental advisory body – Konkursrådet – even referred to the class system of the PRD 2019 as ‘unnecessarily complicated‘, and pointed out that it can ‘potentially lead to an increase in costs’.[12] As also mentioned in section 2, the amendments to the restructuring procedure were already introduced in 2021. Yet, the implementation of the PRD 2019 seems to introduce mandatory requirements put forward by the EU, but not necessarily tailored to the needs of Danish insolvency law. However, the PRD 2019’s provisions on executory contracts provided an opportunity to fine-tune the existing Danish framework, for both the ordinary restructuring and the bankruptcy procedures, along of course with the newly introduced preventive restructuring procedure. These fine-tuning changes initiated by the PRD 2019 have been warmly received by the stakeholders in Danish insolvency law.


In October 2019, the Danish Ministry of Justice mandated the governmental advisory body – Konkursrådet – to consider the legal consequences of the PRD 2019 in Danish insolvency law. This was coupled with a mandate to propose new legislation that aimed to make Danish insolvency law compliant with EU law.[13] Due to COVID-19, the preparatory work of Konkursrådet was postponed, and in May 2021, the Ministry of Justice asked the EU Commission for a suspension on implementation until  July 17, 2022, which was, subsequently, granted. In February 2022, Konkursrådet published its report on the implementation and a proposal for amendments to the Danish Bankruptcy Act. In March 2022, a public consultation was held, with mainly positive remarks towards the proposal put forward. However, it was also reiterated that the existing framework seemed to be efficient and to function overall well. In fact, some of the suggested provisions, specifically the voting system provisions based on Article 9 PRD 2019, were regarded as overcomplicating the existing process.[14] In the course of April-June 2022, the proposal went through the ordinary legislative process without any significant changes and was finally unanimously adopted on 9 June 2022.


4. Main features introduced by the reform

4.1.   Objective and scope of the procedure

The objective of the new preventive restructuring procedure is to provide not only insolvent debtors, but also not yet insolvent debtors with a procedure to overcome or avoid their insolvency. Only debtors that engage in commercial activities – meaning non-consumers - can use the procedure. Not providing the same opportunities for consumers is a novelty for Danish insolvency law, but it is reasoned by the purpose of the procedure, which is to rescue viable businesses. A debtor who has been placed in compulsory dissolution by a public authority cannot make use of the new procedure.


4.2.   Criteria/test to enter the new procedure

Before 2022, Danish insolvency law only operated with the legal concept of insolvency. According to Danish law, a debtor is insolvent when he is unable to meet his liabilities as and when they fall due, unless this inability is deemed to be temporary.[15] Unlike this insolvency standard, the likelihood of insolvency is not defined in Danish law. However, a debtor is assumed to be in a likelihood of insolvency when this is not disputed.


Since only the debtor – and not the creditors – can initiate the commencement of the procedure, it is expected that it will be very rarely questioned whether the debtor is in a likelihood of insolvency or not. The court is obliged to try if the condition is met if the circumstances of the case calls for it and when disputed, the bankruptcy court will make a decision. The preparatory works provide eight examples of what is meant by likelihood of insolvency. A debtor could be considered in a likelihood of insolvency if he is ‘balance sheet insolvent’ (liabilities exceed his assets) or when he is in a stage of temporary insolvency.[16] It is worth noticing, however, that according to the preparatory works, the threshold should not be set too high, and Konkursrådet also explicitly mentioned that they do not expect or even foresee events of abuse relating to the opening of the procedure.[17] In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the Danish legislator did not choose to implement a viability test at the opening of the procedure. If a court deems the procedure to be ‘hopeless’, the court could end it or refrain from opening it.[18]


4.3.   Involved actors

In accordance with the PRD 2019, the starting point is that the debtor keeps full control over his assets and business as such. It is – unlike other insolvency procedures in Danish law – not mandatory for the court to appoint an insolvency practitioner (IP). However, if a debtor requires a stay, the appointment of an IP is mandatory and the debtor is no longer in full control, however still in general in possession of this assets. The IP facilitates, assists and supervises the debtor in the procedure. Furthermore, a debtor is not entitled to enter into any transactions of material significance without the consent of the IP.


It is also possible for the court to appoint a restructuring accountant in supplement to the IP. The accountant would then prepare and approve financial and accounting records that could support the procedure.[19] While the debtor maintains the control, the creditor’s role in the restructuring procedure sees only to the potential adoption of the restructuring plan in which only affected creditors, but not shareholders, are entitled to vote in order for the plan to become binding.


4.4.   Stay

The PRD 2019’s provisions on the stay of individual enforcement brought significant novelties to Danish insolvency law. First, the stay is now granted upon request of the debtor and therefore non-automatic. The only reason for the court to deny the stay is if the procedure cannot be continued, i.e. when the court considers it hopeless, and when the debtor is acting disloyal or has become solvent.[20] Therefore, the room for the court’s discretion in granting the stay or not is quite limited. If the stay is granted, its scope includes all creditors, except the workers who have privileged claims.[21] The stay will initially last for four weeks, but can be extended by the bankruptcy court up to a year. If the debtor – after a preventive restructuring procedure – commences an ordinary restructuring procedure, the maximum duration of the stay during the latter procedure will be reduced, meaning that no creditors will be affected by a stay for more than a year in total.


4.5.   The plan and the adoption hereof

Before the amendments in 2022 – and still in effect regarding the ordinary restructuring procedure – the adoption of a restructuring plan had a two-stage process. First, the debtor and the PIFOR had to present a tentative plan four weeks after the commencement of the procedure, which was voted on by the creditors. The reason for this step was to provide a solid mandate for the PIFOR to continue its efforts (and for incurring the related costs) of rescuing the debtor’s business, as well as engaging the creditors at a very early stage. If the tentative plan was not adopted, the restructuring procedure would be terminated, and bankruptcy would commence automatically. If, however, the tentative plan was adopted, the debtor and the PIFOR could continue the negotiations and take up the necessary steps in this regard, but no later than six months after the adoption of the tentative plan would the final plan then have to be presented and voted  by the creditors.[22] To simplify the process, the first stage of this two-stage procedure has now been eliminated, when proposing a plan in the preventive restructuring procedure.[23] Only the final plan must now be presented to the creditors and will be voted on.


Prior to this, the 2022 proposed plan had to consist of either a compulsory composition or a sale of the business. If neither of these elements were present, the court could not confirm the plan. While it is still possible for the debtor to propose either a composition or a business transfer, this is no longer mandatory. Both in a preventive restructuring procedure and in an ordinary restructuring procedure the debtor is now free to propose any solution to the financial difficulties that will restore the debtor’s solvency.[24] It is, however, still possible to propose a liquidation plan,[25] even though this does not necessarily restore the debtor’s solvency.


To ensure that the basis for the creditor’s decision is sufficient, the DBA  consists of a fairly long list of mandatory information that must be provided to the creditors no later than five days before the creditors’ voting meeting.[26] This includes accounting information, information on assets and liability, a statement from the PIFOR regarding the analysis of both the causes of the financial difficulties, as well as whether the proposed plan is fair and feasible.[27] These requirements were already in place before the implementation of the PRD 2019 and the legislator provided that the existing information requirements were in accordance with Article 8 PRD 2019, so the existing rules were not amended.[28]


At the creditors’ meeting, the affected creditors must vote on the plan. The voting system and rules underwent significant changes due to the requirements of the PRD 2019. As mentioned before, class formation and voting did not exist in Danish law prior to 2022. The voting system was basically turned upside-down. To reduce the differences between the preventive and the ordinary restructuring procedures, the new voting system has also been introduced in the existing procedure. Prior to the implementation of the PRD 2019, a restructuring plan was approved if there was not a majority of creditors – based on the amount of the claims – who voted against the plan. This provided for a very flexible and efficient voting system, and often only a few – if any – creditors would be present at the voting meeting. It was – and still is – allowed to vote by proxy, and often the PIFOR would do this on behalf of some of the major creditors. This ‘deemed approval’ system was rolled back, as the legislator explicitly mentioned that this was a requirement of Article 9(6)PRD.[29] It is therefore now required that a majority of the creditors present at the meeting based on the amount of their claims must vote in favour of the plan. When voting in classes, the creditors in each class will vote on the plan, and the creditors adopt the plan when the majority of the classes is in favour of the plan. The Danish legislator refrained from granting voting rights to equity holders, and exempted the related parties from voting plan as well.


Class voting has been introduced in 2022 into the Danish insolvency law for the first time. The stakeholders in the area of insolvency law greeted the class formation and amendments of the voting system with some scepticism. Even Konkursrådet stated that the system was ‘unnecessarily complicated and could lead to further administrative costs’.[30] Possibly due to this reluctance, the legislator allowed the SMEs to opt out of treating the affected creditors in different classes, in accordance with Article 9(4) PRD 2019.[31] SME’s are in the DBA undertakings which on their balance sheet dates do not exceed at least two of the three criteria’s: balance sheet total: EUR 20 000 000; net turnover: EUR 40 000 000; and average number of employees during the financial year: 250.[32] Since such undertakings in Denmark are fairly rare, it is expected that the class voting system will not be used frequently.


According to the DBA, the debtor is free to divide the creditors into different classes provided that the classes ‘reflect sufficient commonality of interest’ of the creditors within each class.[33] The only mandatory requirement is that secured creditors must be placed in a class of its own. It is worth noticing, however, that the secured creditor can be placed in two different classes, since only the part of the claim that is secured needs to be put in a separate class.[34] The unsecured claim, therefore, should be placed in another class of unsecured claims. The preparatory works explicitly mention that the debtor is also allowed to divide unsecured creditors (who have the same rank in bankruptcy) into different classes, thus making it possible to place suppliers, public authorities and financial creditors into different classes. It is then the bankruptcy court who oversees if the proposed class formation is in accordance with the law. The court’s decision on this cannot be appealed.[35]


Despite the flexibility in the class formation, it must be noted that it is not possible to propose different solutions to these classes, since the plan must not propose elements that are in breach of the insolvency equality principle.[36] Creditors – who are protected by the same rank in the bankruptcy procedure, i.e. all unsecured creditors – must be treated in the same way. The Danish implementation, therefore, is founded on the absolute priority rule. However it is implemented in the voting rules and not in the confirmation rules, as will be discussed below.


4.6.   Confirmation of the plan

The bankruptcy court must confirm a plan.[37] However, there are five grounds where the court must reject the plan: 1) in the event of formal mistakes in the adoption process and where this has had an effect on the outcome of the voting; 2) if the plan is not in accordance with the law, i.e. if the plan writes down privileged debt; 3) if a third party or the debtor, in order to influence the voting, have granted benefits to a voting creditor outside the plan; 4) if the plan discharges debt of a natural person, the plan may not be a circumvention of the requirement laid down in the Danish discharge procedure;[38] and finally,5) if the plan does not meet the best-interest-test. The best-interest-test had to be fulfilled before 2022 as well. However, now, in accordance with the PRD 2019, the wording in the DBA section 13 e was made more precise. It was made evident that decisive is whether a creditor – who has not consented– would be worse off under a restructuring plan compared to the normal ranking in case of liquidation.[39] It is, however, worth noticing that the plan should be compared to the potential future outcome of a liquidation (bankruptcy) procedure. In this regard, the Danish legislator has opted not to implement the possibility of comparing the restructuring plan to the next best alternative.[40] The court’s confirmation or rejection of the plan can be appealed to the Danish High Courts.[41]


4.7.   Possibilities for a debt-for-equity swap

The possibilities to pursue a debt-for-equity swap under the preventive and ordinary restructuring procedure have been amended quite dramatically with implementation of the PRD 2019. This was done explicitly because of the wording of Article 12 PRD, which states that EU Member States ‘shall ensure by other means that those equity holders are not allowed to unreasonably prevent or create obstacles to the adoption and confirmation of a restructuring plan’. This has lead the Danish legislator to introduce the possibility to write-down equity without consent of the shareholders and without having to go through the ordinary procedure of a company’s general meeting, as provided by the Danish Company Act. The DBA now allows that a company can fully write-down the existing shares if 1) the company is illiquid – thus requiring cash flow insolvency, and 2) if the company’s liabilities exceed the value of the assets – thus requiring balance sheet insolvency.[42] Both forms of insolvency must be proven to legitimise a forced write-down. If this is the case, the write-down can be part of the plan, on which the creditors vote. Basically, this means that it is in the hands of the creditors, not the shareholders whether there will be a write-down. Precisely because the company is insolvent, it is not regarded a problem that the shareholders cannot vote on the plan. They are not affected financially since their shares do not hold any financial value. If the company does not meet the double insolvency test, the write down can not be forced by this provision and the creditors must rely on regular company law. 


The company must fulfil the ‘minimum shares requirement’ laid down in Danish law and requiring that the write-down of existing shares must be followed by the issuance of new shares. The new shares cannot be issued directly in a debt-for-equity swap since the law requires that the issuance of new shares must be paid in cash.[43] However, as mentioned by the legislator, it is possible to write-down existing shares in combination with writing down debt for some creditors, so long as these creditors pay the minimum cash capital requirement. In this way, the plan can de facto provide for a debt-for-equity swap.[44]


4.8.   Executory contracts

As required by Article 7(4) PRD 2019, Danish law provides that creditors are not allowed to withhold performance, terminate, accelerate or, in any other way, modify essential executory contracts to the detriment of the debtor during a stay. Technically, this has been done by copying the existing regulation on executory contracts for application in the preventive restructuring procedure. This was done with some modifications because a debtor might not be insolvent yet.[45] When a stay is granted, the debtor is allowed to ‘continue’ his executory contracts on the same terms as before the commencement of the procedure.[46] The right to choose which contracts should be continued is entrusted to the debtor, as the debtor-in-possession. However, the appointed IP must give his consent to the continuation of the contract.[47] When the debtor chooses to continue a contract, the rights and liabilities will remain the same and the claims arising from such a contract will be treated as preferential claims according to the DBA section 94.[48] Thus, the debtor and its creditors can only amend and terminate the contract in accordance with Danish contract law. It is worth noticing that the creditor’s contractual right to terminate the contract due to a delay in (or lack of) payment of the debts, that came into existence prior to the commencement of the stay, is not prohibited.[49]


To reduce the obstacles to continuation of the debtor’s operations, and more specifically, to protect the debtor’s cash flow during the restructuring procedure, the DBA also prohibits the counterparty to demand additional security. This includes demanding provision of security for performing according to the contract, withholding its performance or demanding performance prior to its due date.[50]


4.9.   Jurisdiction for and recognition of court decisions in Europe

Denmark is not bound by the EIR 2015.[51] Under Danish insolvency law, a debtor must file for the preventive restructuring procedure at the bankruptcy court where he engages in financial activities.[52] This requirement bears similarities to the COMI assessment, as the place of the debtor’s central administration is usually where he engages in financial activities.[53] Contrary to Article 3(2) EIR 2015, it is not possible to file for preventive restructuring when the debtor only has an establishment in Denmark.


In literature, it has been discussed whether preventive restructuring procedures can be covered by the Brussels Ibis Regulation,[54] especially if the procedure is non-public or based purely on company law.[55] In case a preventive restructuring procedure will be covered by Brussels Ibis, it will also be recognised in Denmark. Looking at the Danish preventive restructuring procedure, it is non-public until the time where a stay is established or a proposal for a plan is presented. The legislator has refrained from stating whether the preventive restructuring procedure could then be considered to be covered by Brussels Ibis. This remains to be decided on by the courts.


5.       Outlook and conclusion

As already mentioned, some of the elements of the changes have been met with certain scepticism by both practitioners and lawmakers. Most of the concerns regard the scope of application of the preventive restructuring procedure and its actual usefulness. Danish law already allows a debtor to file for insolvency procedures before he is illiquid, when there is some evidence of such a prospect. Although there is sympathy for the reasoning behind the PRD 2019 and its scope of applicability, the success of getting a debtor to deal with his financial difficulties at an earlier time than is now the case is most likely depending on a change in culture. Another point is how the new adoption and confirmation system will be dealt with in practice. Will judges and practitioners continue to see the new preventive restructuring procedure as unnecessarily complicated, or will they discover new ways of getting the deal through? Not much guidance is provided for the stakeholders in this regard, and it will be interesting to follow if practice will work around the new procedure or work with the new procedure.



[1] The article only refers to material publicly available prior to the closing of the article on 15 October 2022.

[2] L 181/2022 Lov om ændring af konkursloven.

[3] Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency), O.J. L 172/18.

[4] Preamble 88 in Regulation (EU) 2015/838 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast), O.J. L 141/19.

[5] Consolidated Act No 775 2021, Bankruptcy Act, with later amendments, ‘Danish Bankruptcy Act’ (‘Konkursloven’) (DBA). Judicial debt relief is also available as a formal procedure for natural persons.

[6] Some claims are considered privileged, such as workers claim.

[7] Indsæt konkursrådets udtalelse (COVID).

[8] See more Betænkning nr 1555 om Ansattes retsstilling under insolvensbehandling, 190-200.

[9] Ernst and Young: Rekonstruktion, Hvordan virker reglerne i praksis, September 2014.

[10] See J. Paulsen, 5 år med rekonstruktionsbehandling, Erhvervsjuridisk Tidsskrift (2017), ET.2017.23, N. Vendelbo and M. Trabjerg Knudsen, Revision og Regnskabsvæsen (2020), R&R online 2020.09.0068, and J. Paulsen and I. M. Dam, Revision og Regnskabsvæsen (2020), R&R 2020.08.60.

[11] Konkursrådets udtalelse af 3. juli 2020, p. 1. See also the public consultation to L65, FT 2020-21, Tillæg A.

[12] Betænkning 1579/2022, p. 137.

[13] Betænkning 1579/2022, p. 14.

[14] Retsudvalget 2021-22 – L181, Bilag 1.

[15] Cf. DBA section 17 (2).

[16] Betænkning, p. 96

[17] Ibid.

[18] Cf. DBA section 9 h.

[19] Cf. DBA section 9 (b).

[20] Cf. DBA section 9 (h).

[21] Cf. DBA section 9 (d) (2).

[22] Cf. DBA section 13.

[23] Cf. DBA section 9 (f).

[24] Cf. DBA section 10.

[25] Cf. DBA section 10 (a).

[26] Cf. DBA section 13

[27] Cf. DBA section 13 (b) (2).

[28] Betænkning 1579/2022, p. 124.

[29] Betænkning 1579/2022 om revision af reglerne om rekonstruktion, herunder implementering af rekonstruktions- og insolvensdirektivet, p. 135

[30] Betænkning 1579/2022 om revision af reglerne om rekonstruktion, herunder implementering af rekonstruktions- og insolvensdirektivet, p. 137

[31] Cf. DBA section 10 (6).

[32] In accordance with Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA relevance, Article 3(3) and Årsregnskabslovens § 7.

[33] Cf. DBA section 13 (d) (5).

[34] Betænkning 1579/2022 om revision af reglerne om rekonstruktion, herunder implementering af rekonstruktions- og insolvensdirektivet, p. 338

[35] Cf. DBA section 249. Whether this limitation of appeal is in accordance with Article 16 PRD 2019could be discussed. However, it is a judicial authority and not an administrative authority – the bankruptcy court – which is competent to decide on the class formation.

[36] Cf. DBA section 10 c.

[37] Cf. DBA section 13 (e), in accordance with Article 9 PRD.

[38] This requirement is the result of a debate initiated by a few judgements from the Supreme Courts in 2018 and 2019. The Supreme Court found it necessary to reject confirmation of a plan based on a doubtful legal interpretation of the existing confirmation rules when it was obvious that the debtor would not have met the criteria for a discharge in the ordinary discharge procedure, i.e. if the debt was based on criminal acts. See further U 2018. 3090H and U2019.1859H.

[39] Betænkning 1579/2022 om revision af reglerne om rekonstruktion, herunder implementering af rekonstruktions- og insolvensdirektivet, p. 157.

[40] Article 2(1)(6) PRD 2019.

[41] Cf. DBA section 249.

[42] Cf. DBA section 10 (8).

[43] Cf. DBA section 10 (8).

[44] Betænkning 1579/2022 om revision af reglerne om rekonstruktion, herunder implementering af rekonstruktions- og insolvensdirektivet, p. 127.

[45] One example of modification is the fact that the right for the debtor to re-establish already terminated contracts has not been transferred to the new framework. Contrary to DBA section 12o.

[46] Cf. DBA section 9 (e).

[47] DBA, section 12 o (1) See further on the requirements of consent –K.  Jensen, R. Bank-Pedersen, H. Christensen, S. Jensen, J. Madsen and A. Mylin, Rekonstruktion – teori og praksis (2nd edition), Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2020, p. 357-358 and DBA, section 12 o (3).

[48] DBA section 9 (e) and 12 (p). There are limits on the preferential treatment of claims in continuous contracts, cf. DBA section 12 p (2).

[49] DBA section 9 (e) (2) with reference to DBA section 58 (2) If this is in accordance with the wording of Article 7(4) PRD 2019 could be challenged.

[50] DBA, section 12 (q) (1).

[51] Cf. Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and EIR 2015 preamble 88.

[52] Cf. DBA section 3.

[53] See more on this, L. H. Langkjær, ‘De danske domstoles internationale kompetence på det konkursretlige område – i lyset af EU’s insolvensforordning’, Karnov Group (2019)

[54] Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351/1.

[55] CERIL Report 2022-2 on Cross-Border Effects in European Preventive Restructuring, 6 July 2022.


Adoption of plans
Danish Scheme
Preventive Restructuring


Line Langkjær

is an Associate Professor at Aarhus University